De, Trevisan and Tulsiani [CRYPTO 2010] show that every distribution over n-bit strings which has constant statistical distance to uniform (e.g., the output of a pseudorandom generator mapping n − 1 to n bit strings), can be distinguished from the uniform distribution with advantage by a circuit of size O(2 n 2 ). We generalize this result, showing that a distribution which has less than k bits of minentropy, can be distinguished from any distribution with k bits of δ-smooth min-entropy with advantage by a circuit of size O(2 k 2 /δ 2 ). As a special case, this implies that any distribution with support at most 2 k (e.g., the output of a pseudoentropy generator mapping k to n bit strings) can be distinguished from any given distribution with min-entropy k + 1 with advantage by a circuit of size O(2 k 2 ). Our result thus shows that pseudoentropy distributions face basically the same non-uniform attacks as pseudorandom distributions. 
Introduction
De, Trevisan and Tulsiani [2] show a non-uniform attack against any pseudorandom generator (PRG) which maps {0, 1} n−1 → {0, 1} n . For any ≥ 2 −n/2 , their attack achieves distinguishing advantage and can be realized by a circuit of size O 2 n 2 . Their attack doesn't even need the PRG to be efficiently computable.
In this work we consider a more general question, where we ask for attacks distinguishing a distribution from any distribution with slightly higher min-entropy. We generalize [2] , showing a non-uniform attack which, for any , δ > 0, distinguishes any distribution with < k bits of min-entropy from any distribution with k bits of δ-smooth min-entropy with advantage , and where the distinguisher is of size O(2 k 2 /δ 2 ). As a corollary we recover the [2] result, showing that the output of any pseudoentropy generator {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n can be distinguished from any variable with min-entropy k + 1 with advantage by circuits of size O(2 k 2 ).
From a theoretical perspective, we prove where the separation between pseudoentropy and smooth min-entropy lies, by classifying how powerful computationally bounded adversaries can be so they can still be fooled to "see" more entropy than there really is.
From a more practical perspective, our result shows that using pseudoentropy instead of pseudorandomness (which for many applications is sufficient and allows for saving in entropy quantity [3] ), will not give improvements in terms of quality (i.e., the size and advantage of distinguishers considered), at least not against generic non-uniform attacks.
Notation and Basic Definitions
Two variables X and Y are (s, A variable X has min-entropy k if it doesn't take any particular outcome with probability greater 2 −k , it has δ-smooth min-entropy k [6] , if it's δ close to some distribution with min-entropy k. X has k bits of HILL pseudoentoentry of quality (s, ) if there exists a Y with min-entropy k that is (s, ) indistinguishable from X, we use the following standard notation for these notions min-entropy:
Our Contribution
In this work give generic non-uniform attacks on pseudoentropy distributions. A seemingly natural goal is to consider a distribution X with H ∞ (X) ≤ k bits of min-entropy, strictly larger H HILL s, (X) ≥ k + 1 bits of HILL entropy, and then give an upper bound on s in terms of . This does not work as there are X where
, we can have a large entropy gap H HILL ∞,δ (X) − H ∞ (X) even when considering unbounded adversaries against HILL entropy. For this reason, in our main technical result Lemma 1 below, we must consider distributions with bounded smooth min-entropy. This makes the statement of the lemma somewhat technical. In practice, the distributions considered often have bounded support, for example because they were generated from a short seed by a deterministic process (like a pseudorandom generator). In this case we can drop the smoothness requirement as stated in Theorem 1 below.
Lemma 1 (Nonuniform attacks against pseudoentropy). Suppose that X ∈ {0, 1} n does not have k bits of δ-smooth min-entropy, i.e., H δ ∞ (X) < k, then for any we have
whereÕ(·) hides a factor linear in n.
n be a deterministic (not necessarily efficient) function. Then we have
more generally, for any X over {0, 1} n with support of size ≤ 2
(X) ≤ k + 1.
Proof Outline

A Weaker Result as a Ball-Bins Problem
We outline the proof of a somewhat weakened version of Theorem 1 in the language of balls and bins. For every Y of min-entropy k = k + Ω(1) we want to distinguish Y from X = f (U k ). Suppose for simplicity that Y is flat and f is injective, so that X is also flat. Our strategy will be to hash the points randomly into two bins and take advantage of the fact that the average maximum load is closer to 1 2 when we sample from Y than when drawing from X. The reason is that Y has more balls, so by the law of large numbers, we expect the load to be "more concentrated" around the mean.
Think of throwing balls (inputs x) into two bins (labeled by −1 and 1). If the balls come from the support of X, the expected maximum load (over two bins) equals
Similarly, if the balls come from the support of Y , then maximum load is
In terms of the average load (the load normalized by the total number of balls)
w.h.p. when drawing from Y As k = k + Ω(1) we obtain (with good probability)
Letting D be one of these bins assignments we obtain a distinguisher with advantage = Ω(2 −k/2 ). To generate the assignments efficiently we relax the assumption about choosing bins and assume only that the choices of bins are independent for any group of = 4 balls. The fourth moment method allows us to keep sufficiently good probabilistic guarantees on the maximum load.
The General Case by Random Walk Techniques
A high-level outline and comparison to [2]
Below in Figure 1 we sketch the flow of our argument.
Our starting point is the proof from [2] . They use the fact that a random mapping D : {0, 1} n → {−1, 1} likely distinguishes any two distributions X and Y over {0, 1} n with advantage being the Euclidean distance 
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X has no smooth-min entropy k large bias between X and Y on only 2 k elements enough randomness for this argument, which makes sampling D efficient. Our argument deviates from this approach in two important aspects. The first difference is that in the pseudoentropy case we can improve the advantage from Ω 2 − n 2 , where n is the logarithm of the support of the variables considered, to Ω 2
where k is the min-entropy of the variable we want to distinguish from. The reason is that being statistically far from any k-bit min-entropy distributions implies a large bias on already 2 k elements. This fact (see Lemma 5 and Corollary 3, and also Figure 3 ) is a new characterization of smooth min-entropy of independent interest.
The second subtlety arises when it comes to amplify the advantage over the partition slices. For the pseudorandomness case it is enough to split the domain in a deterministic way, for example by fixing prefixes of n-bit strings, in our case this is not sufficient. For us a "good" partition must shatter the 2 k -element high-biased set, which can be arbitrary. Our solution is to use random partitions, in fact, we show that using 4-universal hashing is sufficient. Generating base distinguishers and partitions at the same time makes probability calculations more involved.
Technical calculations are based on the fourth moment method, similarly as in [2] . The basic idea is that for settings where the second and fourth moment are easy to compute (e.g. sums of independent symmetric random variables) we can obtain good upper and lower bounds on the first moment. In the context of algorithmic applications these techniques are usually credited to [1] . Interestingly, exploiting natural relations to random walks, we show that calculations immediately follow by adopting classical (almost one century old) tools and results [5] , [4] . Our technical novelty is an application of moment inequalities due to Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund and Paley-Zygmund, which allow us to prove slightly more than just the existence of an attack. Namely we generate it with constant success probability.
Advantage
Consider any X with δ-smooth min-entropy smaller than k. This requirement can be seen as a statement about the "shape" of the distribution. Namely, the mass of X that is above the threshold 2 −k equals at least δ, that is
For an illustration see Figure 2 .
An intuition behind the attack. Random ±1-weights make the bias equal to the 2-distance of PX and PY . This distance can be bounded in terms of the 1 distance, which concentrates mass difference δ on less than 2 k elements (the region in gray).
We construct our attack based on this observation. Define the advantage of a function D for distributions X and Y as
(writing also Adv D S when the summation is restricted to a subset S). Consider a random
have zero-mean and second moment equal to 1. Therefore the expected square of of the advantage, over the choice of D, equals
Let S be the set of x such that P X (x) > 2 −k . For any Y of min-entropy at least k we obtain
where the first inequality follows because P Y (x) 2 −k < P X (x) for x ∈ S, the second inequality is by the standard inequality between the first and second norm, and the third inequality follows because we showed that Pr[X ∈ S] |S| · 2 −k + δ (illustrated in Figure 2 ) which also implies |S| 
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By the previous formula on the expected squared advantage this means that
for at least one choice of D. This implies
A random D as defined would be of size exponential in n, but since we used only the second moment in calculations, it suffices to generate D(x) as pairwise independent random variables. By assuming 4-wise independence -which can be computed by O(n 2 ) size circuits -we can prove slightly more, namely that a constant fraction of generated D's are good distinguishers. This property will be important for the next step, where we amplify the advantage assuming larger distinguishers.
Leveraging the advantage by slicing the domain
Consider a random and equitable partition
n . From the previous analysis we know that a random distinguisher achieves advantage = d 2 (P X ; P Y ) over the whole domain. Note that (for any, not necessarily random partition {S i } i ) we have
is the restriction of the distance to the set S i (by restricting the summation to S i ). From a random partition we expect the mass difference between P X and P Y to be distributed evenly among the partition slices (see Figure 3(b) ). Based on the last equation, we expect
to hold with high probability over {S i } i . In fact, if the mass difference is not well balanced amongst the slices (in the extreme case, concentrated on one slice) our argument will not offer any gain over the previous construction (see Figure 3 (a)).
(a) An example of a "bad" partition. Almost all advantage is captured by one partition slice S1.
(b) An example of a "good" partition. The advantage is evenly distributed among slices S1, S2. By applying the previous argument to individual slices, for every i we can obtain an advantage Adv
2 )δ when restricted to the set S i (with high probability over the choice of D and {S i } i ). Now if the sets S i are efficiently recognizable, we can combine them into a better distinguisher. Namely for every i we chose a value β i ∈ {−1, 1} such that D's advantage (before taking the absolute value) restricted to S i has sign β i , and setD (x) = β i D(x), where i is such that x ∈ S i , then the advantage equals (with high probability over D and the S i 's)
We need to specify a 4-wise independent hash for D, another 4-wise independent hash for deciding in which of the T slices an element lies, and T bits to encode the β i 's. Thus for a given T the size ofD will be T +Õ(n). Using the above equation, we then get a smooth tradeoff s = O(2 k 2 δ −2 ) between the advantage and the circuit size s. This discussion shows that to complete the argument we need the following two properties of the partition (a) the mass difference between P X and P Y is (roughly) equidistributed among slices and (b) the membership in partition slices can be efficiently decided.
Slicing using 4-wise independence
To complete the argument, we assume that T is a power of 2, and generate the slicing by using a 4-universal hash function h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} log T . The i-th slice S i is defined as {x ∈ {0, 1} n : h(x) = i}. These assumptions are enough to prove that
Interestingly, the expected advantage (left-hand side) cannot be computed directly. The trick here is to bound it in terms of the second and fourth moment. The above inequality, coupled with bounds on second moments of the advantage AdvD Si (obtained directly), allows us to prove that
This shows that there exists the claimed distinguisherD. In fact, a constant fraction of generated (over the choice of D and { § i } i ) distinguishersD's works.
Random walks
From a technical point of view, our method involves computing higher moments of the advantages to obtain concentration and anti-concentration results. The key observation is that the advantage written down as
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with zero-mean increments
The difference with respect to classical model is that the increments are only -wise independent (for = 4). However, that classical moment bounds still apply (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3 for more details).
Preliminaries
Interpolation Inequalities
Interpolation inequalities show how to bound the p-th moment of a random variable if we know bounds on one smaller and one higher moment. The following result is known also as log-convexity of L p norms, and can be proved by the Hölder Inequality
Lemma 2 (Moments interpolation).
For any p 1 < p < p 2 and any bounded random variable Z we have
where θ is such that Alternatively, we can lower bound a moment given two higher moments. This is very useful when higher moments are easier to compute. In this work will bound first moments from below when we know the second and the fourth moment (which are easier to compute as they are even-order moments)
Moments of random walks
For a random walk x ξ(x), where ξ(x) are independent with zero-mean, we have good control over the moments, namely
where constants depend on p. This result is due to Marcinkiewicz and Zygmund [5] who extended the former result of Khintchine [4] . Below we notice that for small moments p it suffices to assume only p-wise independence (most often used versions assume fully independence) Lemma 3 (Strengthening of Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund's Inequality for p = 4). Suppose that {ξ(x)} x∈X are 4-wise independent, with zero mean. Then we have
The proof appears in Section 4.1.
Anticontentration bounds
Lemma 4 (Paley-Zygmund Inequality). For any positive random variable Z and a parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) we have
we obtain Corollary 2 (Anticoncentration for walks with 4-wise independent increments). Suppose that {ξ(x)} x∈X are 4-wise independent with zero-mean, then we have
where the summation is over x ∈ X .
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 5 (Characterizing smooth min-entropy). For any random variable X with values in a finite set X , any δ and k we have the following equivalence
The proof appears in Section 4.2. We will work with the following equivalent statement Proof of Corollary 3. The direction ⇐= trivially follows by the definition of smooth minentropy. Now assume H δ ∞ (X) < k. Let S be the set of all x such that P X (x) > 2 −k , then |S| < 2 k , and moreover by Lemma 5 we have x∈S
Lemma 6 (Bias implies Euclidean distance). For any distributions P X , P Y on X and any subset S of X we have 
Proof. By the Jensen Inequality we have
Proof of Corollary 4. It suffices to combine Lemma 6 and Corollary 3.
By Corollary 2 we conclude that the advantage of a random distinguisher for any two measures (in our case P X and P Y ) equals the Euclidean distance.
Lemma 7 (The advantage of a random distinguisher equals the Euclidean distance). Let {D(x)} x∈{0,1} n be 4-wise independent as indexed by x and such that D(x) outputs a random element from {−1, 1}. Then for any set S we have
with probability 
Partitioning the domain into T slices
, where t = log T , be a 4-universal hash function. Define
The following corollary shows that on each of our T slices, we get the advantage T 
(the statement is valid for arbitrary measures in place of P X , P Y ). 
The corollary shows that the total absolute advantage over all partition slices, is as expected.
where for β i def = sgn x∈Si (P X (x ) − P Y (x)) D(x) (the sign of the advantage on the ith slice) we define β(x) = β i where S i contains x. This shows that by "flipping" the distinguisher output on the slices we achieve the sum of individual advantages. Since the bit β(x) can be computed with O(T ) +Õ(n) advice (the complexity of the function i → β i plus the complexity of finding i for a given x) we obtain 
Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3 (Strengthening of Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund's Inequality for p = 4)
Denote Z = x ξ(x). Since ξ(x) are (in particular) 2-wise independent with zero mean, we get
The fourth moment is somewhat more complicated (whenever ξ(x) appears in an odd power, for example x = x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = x 4 the expectation is zero. This observation may be used to simplify and bound also higher moments, see [7] and the upper bound follows by Jensen's Inequality (with constant 1).
Proof of Lemma 5 (Characterizing smooth min-entropy)
Suppose that H δ ∞ (X) k. then, by definition, there is Y such that H ∞ (Y ) k and
x:P X (x)>P Y (x) P X (x) − P Y (x) δ. Since all the summands are positive and since P Y (x) 2 −k , ignoring those x for which P Y (x) < 2 −k yields
Again, since P Y (x) 2 −k we obtain
which finishes the proof of the "=⇒" part. Assume now that δ = x∈X max P X (x) − 2 −k , 0 δ. Note that
and therefore we have x∈X max 2 −k − P X (x), 0 δ . By this observation we can construct a distribution Y by shifting δ of the mass of P X from the set S − = {x : P X (x) > 2 −k } to the set {x : 2 −k P X (x)} in such a way that we have P Y (x) 2 −k for all x. Thus H ∞ (Y ) k and since a δ fraction of the mass is shifted and redistributed we have d 1 (X; Y ) δ . This finishes the proof of the "⇐=" part.
Proof of Corollary 6 ((Mixed) moments of slice advantages)
For shortness denote ∆(x) = P X (x) − P Y (x) and Adv 
